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followers. With peer-induced fairness, the second follower is averse to receiving less than the first follower.
Using laboratory experimental data, we estimate that peer-induced fairness between followers is two times
stronger than distributional fairness between leader and follower. Allowing for heterogeneity, we find that 50
percent of subjects are fairness-minded. We discuss how peer-induced fairness might limit price
discrimination, account for low variability in CEO compensation, and explain pattern bargaining.
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Standard theories in economics generate predictions of market behavior by invoking two 
fundamental assumptions. First, agents are self-interested in that their utility function depends 
only on their own material payoffs. Second, market behavior is at equilibrium so that no indi-
vidual agent can achieve a higher payoff by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium. Recent 
advances in behavioral economics relax both assumptions by allowing agents, for example, to 
care about others’ payoffs and to make mistakes (see Matthew Rabin 1998; Colin F. Camerer, 
George Loewenstein, and Rabin 2004; and Ho, Noah Lim, and Camerer 2006a, b, for com-
prehensive reviews). This paper focuses on the self-interested assumption and investigates how 
social comparison may lead to fairness concerns between peers.
A simple and powerful way to demonstrate that people are not purely self-interested is to study the 
so-called ultimatum game. In this game, a leader and a follower divide a fixed pie. The leader moves 
first and offers a division of the pie to the follower. The follower can accept or reject. If the follower 
accepts, the pie is distributed according to the proposal. If the follower rejects, both players earn 
nothing. When players care only about their own material payoffs, the subgame perfect equilibrium 
predicts that the leader should offer a small amount (e.g., a dime) to the follower and the follower 
would accept (since a dime is strictly preferred to nothing). However, data from many experiments 
(where subjects are motivated by substantial financial incentives) cast doubt on this sharp prediction. 
Typically, there are almost no offers below 20 percent of the pie. A majority of offers are between 30 
percent to 40 percent. Low offers are frequently rejected and the frequency of rejection increases as 
the offer decreases. These findings are robust to stake size (Robert Slonim and Alvin E. Roth 1998), 
persist with repeated trials (Roth et al. 1991), and prevail across diverse cultures (Joseph Henrich 
2000; Henrich et al. 2001; Miguel Costa-Gomes and Klaus G. Zauner 2001). 
Several solutions have been proposed to resolve this anomaly. These solutions modify a  player’s 
utility function by allowing it to depend on the payoffs of other players (for a review see Ernst 
Fehr and Urst Fischbacher 2002). In the ultimatum example, each player’s utility function now 
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depends on what both players receive. Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999) propose the so-called 
“inequity aversion” model in which a player has a disutility of receiving a payoff that is different 
from those of the other players. The extent of disutility depends on the player’s relative payoff 
position; players exhibit a stronger disutility from “being behind” than from “being ahead.” Gary 
Charness and Rabin (2002) extend the inequity aversion model to incorporate reciprocity in the 
utility function (see also Rabin 1993; Fehr and Simon Gachter 2000). This generalized utility 
function allows players to reciprocate when others have been nice or mean toward them. Gary 
Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000) propose the Equity-Reciprocity-Competition (ERC) model in 
which each agent’s utility function depends on her absolute payoff as well as her relative share of 
the total payoff. Under ERC, given an absolute payoff, an agent’s utility is maximized when her 
share is equal to the average share. The models of fairness concerns above can be used to capture 
situations in which agents’ social preferences depend on payoffs of other economic agents. We 
call this distributional fairness concerns.
However, in many real-life situations, people are also driven by social comparison (Leon 
Festinger 1954). That is, they have a drive to look to others who are in similar circumstances 
(i.e., their peers) to evaluate their outcomes and judge whether they have been treated fairly. We 
term this tendency peer-induced fairness concerns. Indeed, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) suggest that 
the reference agent for fairness in their inequity aversion model can also come from an exter-
nal source. Specifically, they wrote, “the determination of the relevant reference group and the 
relevant reference outcome for a given class of individuals is ultimately an empirical question” 
(821). Building on their insight, and allowing for different types of reference agent, we distinguish 
between peer-induced fairness concerns (relative to one’s peers) and distributional fairness con-
cerns (relative to other players in the game) and study them simultaneously. We posit that peer-
induced fairness concerns can be more salient than distributional fairness concerns when agents 
engage in social comparison. This is so because social comparison creates a powerful reference 
point or benchmark for players to compare their well-being with that of their peer groups. 
In this paper, we study peer-induced fairness in a social situation involving three economic 
agents. There is one leader and two followers. The followers have a similar endowment and the 
leader plays an ultimatum game with each follower in sequence. Each game involves the leader 
making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to one of the followers. The two games are identical and inde-
pendent in that the leader plays the same game with each follower and actions of one game have 
no bearing on the material payoffs of the other game. However, in between the two games, the 
second follower obtains an informative but imperfect public signal of the first offer, and uses this 
signal to infer the first follower’s payoff. We analyze this social situation but allow all agents to 
have distributional fairness concerns and the second follower to have also peer-induced fairness 
concerns. Our model predicts that if subjects noisily best-respond, the second follower’s likeli-
hood of accepting an offer decreases in the signal, suggesting that an identical offer can become 
less attractive as the second follower’s belief of the first follower’s payoff increases. In addition, 
the leader’s offer to the second follower is contingent on the signal. The higher the signal, the 
more attractive the offer will be. 
Let us consider three classes of examples of this game. First, consider a seller that interacts 
with multiple buyers (e.g., a manufacturer and multiple retailers, a firm and multiple customers). 
Each seller-buyer transaction is independent in that actions within a transaction do not influ-
ence material outcomes of other transactions. As distributional fairness would suggest, each 
individual buyer may care about the seller’s payoff in their own respective transaction (in addi-
tion to her own material payoff). On the other hand, peer-induced fairness suggests that each 
individual buyer may also care a lot about what other buyers receive in their interactions with the 
same seller. For example, a customer cares about what other customers pay for the same product. 
Similarly, a retailer cares about what contract terms other retailers receive from the same manu-
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facturer. A buyer will treat any unfavorable differences in price or contract terms as entirely 
unfair. Second, consider a boss who hires multiple workers with the same skills and performing 
the same tasks. Clearly, workers care about not only their own wages but also the wages of their 
peer workers. In fact, bosses often pay their workers a similar wage despite substantial differ-
ences in productivity in order to avoid demoralizing less productive workers.1 Third, consider a 
family with multiple children. Sibling rivalry is common and it frequently arises from parents 
showing favoritism. Clearly, this phenomenon implies that each child’s utility function depends 
also on other children’s payoffs.2
We test our model’s predictions experimentally by engaging subjects in two independent ulti-
matum games as described above. Using this setup, we find support for our model’s predictions. 
The follower in the second ultimatum game rejects the offer more frequently as the obtained signal 
increases. The leader’s offer is strategic in that she exploits the second follower when the signal is 
low (even when she has made a good offer to the first follower) and concedes more when the signal 
is high. In addition, we structurally estimate the model parameters using the data. The estimated 
peer-induced fairness parameter is two times larger than the distributional fairness parameter, sug-
gesting that the former is more salient in such social settings. We also incorporate heterogeneity in 
subjects’ taste for fairness by using a latent-class approach. We allow for two different segments, 
one that is purely self-interested and another that has distributional and peer-induced fairness con-
cerns. Our estimation results suggest that about half the subjects are purely self-interested. 
The concept of peer-induced fairness has wide economic implications. We briefly discuss three 
applications in this paper. First, we show how peer-induced fairness can constrain a monopoly’s 
ability to price discriminate. Without peer comparisons, the monopoly has complete freedom 
to maximize profits in separate markets that have different economic characteristics. However, 
when consumers are averse to paying more than their peers, the monopoly may have to narrow 
price differentials across markets. Second, we show that peer-induced fairness can lead to wage 
compression. In particular, we show that low variability in CEO compensation packages (see 
Charles A. O’Reilly, Brian G. Main, and Graef S. Crystal 1988, for empirical evidence) is neces-
sary in order to prevent dissatisfaction resulting from peer comparisons (i.e., with other CEOs). 
Third, peer-induced fairness can explain the phenomenon of so-called “pattern bargaining” (see 
Harold M. Levinson 1960; Robert C. Marshall and Antonio Merlo 2004). In many industries, 
a centralized labor union may negotiate with multiple firms sequentially. Pattern bargaining 
occurs when the union uses the agreement reached with the first firm as a reference to set the 
pattern for all subsequent negotiations. Our model naturally explains this phenomenon by peer-
induced fairness; any subsequent agreement cannot deviate too much from the outcome of the 
first negotiation. Pattern bargaining can be problematic when the union and a sequential firm 
select different reference benchmarks, because this difference can restrict the set of feasible 
negotiation outcomes and lead to labor strikes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I formulates the basic model and presents 
the main equilibrium results. Section II describes the experimental design and procedure. Section 
III presents the experimental results and calibrates the basic model using the data. Section IV 
generalizes the basic model by incorporating heterogeneity. Section V describes three economic 
applications of peer-induced fairness. Section VI concludes.
1 George A. Akerlof and Janet Yellen (1990) show that if workers proportionately withdraw their effort because 
of peer-induced fairness concerns, this behavioral tendency can cause unemployment. Similarly, Fehr, George 
Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl (1993) show that sellers respond to higher prices from buyers by offering superior quality 
products.
2 The sibling rivalry example does not fit our model setup exactly. While our model assumes that there are two 
independent pies to be negotiated, the two pies in the sibling example may depend on each other. However, the general 
notion of peer-induced fairness does apply here too.
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I. Basic Model
A. model setup
There are three players—one leader and two followers. The leader plays an identical ultima-
tum game with each of the followers in sequence. In each game, there is a fixed pie of size π to 
be divided between the leader and one of the followers. The leader moves first and offers s1 to the 
first follower. The first follower’s decision a1 can either be to accept (a1 = 1) or to reject (a1 = 0). 
If a1 = 1, the leader receives π − s1 and the follower receives s1. Otherwise, both receive zero. 
The second follower obtains a signal z = s1 + ε, where ε is a zero-mean random noise term with 
an arbitrary distribution function f (·) and density function f (·). Based on this signal, the second 
follower makes inferences regarding the first offer, and these beliefs influence his decision to 
accept or reject. The same signal z is observed by the leader before the second game begins. 
Then, the leader makes an offer s2 to the second follower, possibly based on the signal z. Again, 
the follower’s decision a2 can be either to accept (a2 = 1) or to reject (a2 = 0). If a2 = 1, the 
leader receives π − s2 and the follower receives s2. Otherwise, both receive nothing. Note that 
the leader receives material payoff in both games while each of the followers receives material 
payoff in their respective game. 
Let us define the agent’s utility functions. Consider the utility function of the first follower 
Uf1 (s1, a1). The follower’s utility function has two components. The first component is the agent’s 
material payoff from the game and the second component reflects the first follower’s disutility 
from receiving a payoff that is behind that of the leader. Hence, the second component captures 
distributional fairness concerns:
 s1 − δ max{0, (π − s1) − s1 }, if a1 = 1,(1)  Uf1 (s1, a1) =  e   0, if a1 = 0.
Here, δ is the parameter capturing the degree of aversion from being distributionally behind.3
The second follower’s utility function Uf2 (s2, a2) is defined similarly, except that it contains an 
additional component. This component arises from the second follower’s tendency of comparing 
herself to a similar peer (i.e., the first follower) and reflects the disutility from being behind. Recall 
that z = s1 + ε is the signal observed by the second follower and the leader. Using the signal z, 
the second follower can infer the probability  ˆ     p (z) = P (a1 = 1 | z) that the first offer is accepted 
and the conditional expectation of what the first follower receives  ˆ    s1(z) = E (s1 | z, a1 = 1). We 
will discuss the signal inference process in more detail later. For now, let us use  ˆ    p (z) and  ˆ    s1(z) to 
denote these inferences. The second follower’s utility function is given next: 
 s2 − δ max{0, (π − s2 ) −s2 }(2)  Uf2 (s2, a2 | z) = e  − ρ  ˆ     p (z) max{0,  ˆ    s1 (z) − s2 } if a2 = 1,
   0, if a2 = 0.
3 Our model can be extended to include an additional disutility term resulting from being ahead. This is in the spirit 
of Charness and Rabin (2002) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). For example, the first follower’s utility function can also 
include the term −δ′ max{0, s1 − (π − s1)}. However, in Table 4 below, additionally allowing for this parameter yields 
the estimate  ˆ  
  δ′ = 0. Thus, distributional fairness concerns associated with being ahead are absent in our experimental 
data. We chose to use the simplest possible model to demonstrate the existence of peer-induced fairness because it 
makes the model more tractable and allows us to generate sharp predictions about subjects’ behavior.
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As before, the parameter δ reflects the second follower’s degree of aversion from being distribu-
tionally behind the leader. In addition, the parameter ρ represents the degree of aversion from 
being behind in a social comparison with a peer.4 We define “peer” as a reference agent who 
satisfies two conditions. First, the reference agent must play the same role or position in the 
game (e.g., another follower). Second, the reference agent must face the same social situation 
(e.g., both have accepted or both have rejected the offer). In general, the notion of a peer can 
clearly go beyond these specific contexts. In a clever study using a panel-level dataset, Erzo F. 
P. Luttmer (2005) shows that a person’s self-reported happiness decreases with an increase in 
neighbors’ incomes. Clearly, the neighbors may not have the same employer or even occupation. 
In our experimental setup, subjects interact anonymously and the task context becomes the only 
relevant cue for determining who their peer is. Luttmer’s finding suggests that other social cues 
such as geographical location and regular social interactions can be equally compelling as crite-
ria for defining a peer. 
Linking this definition of a peer to the utility function (I.2), there are two cases. The first is 
when the second follower accepts (a2 = 1). In this case, there is probability  ˆ    p (z) that the first 
follower has also accepted. The second follower treats the first follower as a peer and experi-
ences a disutility when what she receives, s2, is behind what she believes the first follower has 
received,  ˆ    s1(z). The second case is when the second follower rejects (a2 = 0). In this case, the 
first follower must also have rejected to qualify as a peer, and both followers get nothing. So the 
second follower’s utility is zero.5 
The leader receives material payoffs from both ultimatum games. In the second game, the 
leader receives the utility UL,ii (s2, a2 | z), given as
 π − s2 − δ max{0, s2 − (π − s2 )}, if a2 = 1,(3)  UL,ii (s2, a2 | z) = e  0, if a2 = 0. 
Note that the leader’s utility in the second game depends on the signal z = s1 + ε, insofar as 
the second follower’s decision rests upon it. In the first game, the leader receives the utility 
UL,i  (s1, a1) as follows:
 π − s1 − δ max{0, s1 − (π − s1)}, if a1 = 1,(4)  UL,i (s1, a1) = e 0, if a1 = 0.
The general model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) allows for fairness concerns between all possi-
ble pairs of players. Our model builds on their model by allowing two different kinds of  fairness 
4 The aversion of being behind is similar to the notion of loss aversion (Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 1979; 
Camerer 2000). People have a negative transaction utility when receiving a payoff that is below a well-defined reference 
point. Ronald Bosman and Frans van Winden (2002) show that a follower’s expectation of what she is likely to receive 
serves as a reference point and can significantly influence her acceptance decision in a continuous version of an ulti-
matum game. The notion of loss aversion has also been applied to a business-to-business channel setting to show why 
nonlinear pricing contracts may not work as well as the standard models would suggest, because these pricing contracts 
yield a negative transaction utility (Lim and Ho 2007; and Ho and Juanjuan Zhang 2008).
5 It is possible that the second follower, when rejecting, may engage in social comparison with the first follower who 
has accepted. If this is true, the second follower will experience a negative utility of −η  ˆ     p (z)  ˆ    s1 (z) from rejecting, since 
there is a probability  ˆ    p (z) that the first follower has accepted and received  ˆ    s1 (z). Here, we distinguish the parameter η from our parameter ρ above, because the former involves social comparison with an agent in a different situation. 
Allowing for η in our structural model estimation yields an estimate  ˆ    η = 0. Also, a nested model restricting ρ = η is 
strongly rejected (χ2 = 108,  p < 0.01). Consequently, we did not include η in our model to simplify exposition.
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for different pairs of players. Specifically, we distinguish fairness concerns between the leader 
and a follower from fairness concerns between two followers, and show that the latter can be 
more significant when players engage in social comparison. 
We can solve the game using the standard backward induction principle. In the second game, 
the leader chooses s2 to maximize UL,ii (s2, a2 | z). In the first game, the leader chooses s1 to maxi-
mize UL,i (s1, a1) + UL,ii (s2, a2 | z).
B. second follower’s inferences,  ˆ     p (z) and  ˆ    s1 (z)
The model assumes that the second follower has a prior belief about what the first offer is and 
denotes the density and distribution of this prior by g(·) and g(·), respectively. We assume that 
g(·) is normally distributed. The second follower has a noisy rational expectation in that g(·) 
has a mean of s1 and a standard deviation of σ1. Given the signal z = s1 + ε, the second follower 
forms a posterior belief of the first offer, with density h(·), given by
(5)  h(x | z) =    g(x) f  (z − x)  _______________ 
 ∫∞ −∞   g(x) f  (z − x) dx  .
The second follower anticipates that the first follower has an acceptance threshold A satisfying 
Uf1 (s1 = A, a1 = 1) = 0, so the first follower will accept all offers s1 ≥ A. Therefore, the second 
follower’s inference of the probability  ˆ     p (z) that the first follower has accepted is
(6)   ˆ    p (z) =  ∫ 
A
 
∞
 h(x | z) dx.
Similarly, the second follower’s inference of the first offer, conditional on acceptance, is given 
by
(7)   ˆ   s1 (z) =     ∫A 
∞
   x h (x | z) dx
  ___________
 ∫A ∞   h (x | z) dx .
We add an information inference process by the second follower for three reasons:
 (i) This information inference process makes our model more realistic. In many real-life situ-
ations, the negotiation outcomes are kept confidential so as to avoid social comparison 
(e.g., employees are told not to reveal their raises to their peers). By allowing for imperfect 
information, we make our model applicable to more social settings.
 (ii) By introducing a noisy signal, we allow the leader to change his behavior as a result of the 
signal realization. Had the second follower perfectly known the first follower’s payoff, the 
leader’s offers in the two games would have been the same in equilibrium. Hence, imperfect 
information provides an extra degree of freedom to test the model. For instance, we later 
show that the equilibrium second offer is always higher than the equilibrium first offer.
 (iii) The game with imperfect information also allows us to separate two fundamentally dif-
ferent kinds of peer-induced fairness from the leader’s perspective. The leader may inher-
ently want to treat both followers the same way (e.g., parents showing no favoritism among 
their children).6 In contrast, the leader may care about treating the two followers the same 
6 One can extend the basic model by allowing the leader to have an intrinsic preference for treating the two followers 
identically. This can be accomplished by adding an extra term −β ( Z s1 − s2 Z ) to the leader’s utility function. However, 
our experimental data indicate that the leader tends to choose the second offer based on the second follower’s  inference 
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way only to the extent that the second follower is averse to being behind. In the former, 
the leader will divide the pie the same way in the two games, independent of the signal. If 
the latter is true, the leader will, in fact, choose the second offer contingent on the second 
follower’s belief of what the first follower has received (the higher the belief, the higher 
the offer).
C. Equilibrium Analysis
We work backward to derive the equilibrium predictions. In the second game, the leader makes 
an offer s2 to the second follower, who then decides whether to accept or reject it. Recall that the 
signal of the first offer is z, and the utility function of the second follower is
 s2 − δ max { 0, (π − s2 ) − s2 }(8)  Uf2 (s2, a2 | z) = e − ρ  ˆ     p (z) max { 0,  ˆ    s1 (z) − s2 } if a2 = 1,
 0, if a2 = 0.
Thus, the second follower accepts the offer s2 if and only if Uf2 (s2, 1 | z) ≥ 0. The leader’s utility 
function is
 π − s2 − δ max { 0, s2 − (π − s2 )}, if a2 = 1,(9)  UL,ii (s2, a2 | z) = e 0, if a2 = 0.
Since the leader’s utility UL,ii (s2, 1 | z) always decreases in s2, the leader will want to choose the 
smallest acceptable offer s2 satisfying Uf2 (s2, 1 | z) ≥ 0. The following proposition characterizes 
the optimal offer s*2.
PROPOSITION 1: The leader’s optimal offer to the second follower s*2, as a function of the fol-
lower’s inferences  ˆ    p (z) and  ˆ    s1 (z), is
(10) s*2( ˆ    p (z),  ˆ    s1 (z)) = min emax e π δ ______ 1 + 2 δ ,    π δ + ρ  ˆ     p (z)  ˆ    s1 (z)  _____________1 + 2 δ + ρ  ˆ     p (z) ,   ρ  ˆ     p (z)  ˆ    s1 (z)  _________1 + ρ  ˆ    p (z)  f ,  π (1 + δ) _______1 + 2δ  f .
PROOF:
See Appendix. 
Note that the optimal offer is the minimum of two terms: (i) max{(π δ)/(1 + 2 δ), (π δ +
ρ  ˆ     p (z)  ˆ    s1 (z))/(1 + 2 δ + ρ  ˆ    p (z)), (ρ  ˆ    p (z)  ˆ    s1 (z))/(1 + ρ  ˆ    p (z))}; and (ii) π (1 + δ)/(1 + 2 δ). The first 
term yields the leader’s most preferred offer while satisfying the incentive compatibility con-
straint (i.e., it is the smallest offer that induces the second follower to accept). The second term 
provides an upper bound of the second offer beyond which the leader will make a negative utility 
(due to distributional fairness concerns). The first term is determined by taking the maximum of 
three fractions. Note that the first fraction is independent of ρ and the third fraction is indepen-
dent of δ. Consequently, the first/third fraction becomes relevant when distributional fairness/
of what the first follower has received, which may be different from the actual first offer. Such strategic behavior sug-
gests that the leader does not have a strong intrinsic preference to treat the two followers the same way.
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peer-induced fairness is dominant. The second fraction comes into play when both kinds of fair-
ness are of comparable magnitude. 
Proposition 1 highlights that the equilibrium offer s*2 in the second game is nondecreasing 
in the second follower’s inference  ˆ    s1(z). In fact, when  ˆ    s1(z) is sufficiently large, s*2 is strictly 
increasing in  ˆ    s1(z) in a piecewise linear manner. This provides a sharp prediction on the leader’s 
behavior. If the second follower has peer-induced fairness concerns (i.e., ρ > 0) and the leader 
strategically anticipates such preferences, the leader should make the offer contingent on the 
inference  ˆ    s1(z).
In the first game, the leader makes the offer s1 to the first follower. Recall that the first fol-
lower’s utility function is
 s1 − δ max{0, (π − s1) − s1}, if a1 = 1,(11)  Uf1 (s1, a1) = e 0, if a1 = 0.
Therefore, the first follower accepts the offer s1 if and only if Uf1 (s1, 1) ≥ 0, which can be shown 
to be equivalent to s1 ≥ (π δ)/(1 + 2 δ). In other words, the first follower’s acceptance threshold 
is A = (π δ)/(1 + 2 δ).
How much should the leader offer to the first follower? This decision influences the leader’s 
material payoffs in both the first and the second games. Conditional on s1 in the first game and 
along the equilibrium path in the second, the term UL,ii (s2, a2 | z) can be written in terms of the 
signal z as
(12)  U *L,ii (z) = UL,ii (s*2 (z), a*2 (z) | z).
Since the signal z = s1 + ε, the expected value of the utility above given a first offer s1 is
(13)  EU *L,ii (s1 ) =   ∫ 
−∞
∞
 U *L,ii (s1  + ε) df (ε).
Therefore, the leader chooses the first offer s1 to maximize UL,i (s1, a1) + EU *L,ii (s1 ). The follow-
ing lemma states the relationship between the first offer s1 and the leader’s total expected utility 
in the second game, along the equilibrium path.
LEMMA 2: Condition on s1 and along the equilibrium path, the leader’s total expected utility 
in the second game, EU *L,ii (s1 ), is decreasing in s1. 
PROOF:
See Appendix.
The above lemma suggests that the leader incurs two costs in making a high offer, s1. First, a 
high s1 will lower the leader’s material payoffs in the first game. Second, this same high offer also 
leads to a lower expected utility for the leader in the second game. This is because a high s1 sets a 
high reference point for social comparison by the second follower, and this peer-induced fairness 
effect forces the leader to make a more generous offer, s2. Consequently, the leader will make the 
smallest possible offer, s1,in the first game. This offer is, however, constrained by the first fol-
lower’s distributional fairness concerns. The following proposition states this result formally.
dECEmBER 20092030 ThE AmERiCAN ECONOmiC REViEW
PROPOSITION 3: The leader’s optimal offer to the first follower s*1 is
(14)  s*1  =   π δ ______ 1 + 2 δ .
PROOF:
See Appendix.
As a consequence of Proposition 3, we have the following corollary.
COROLLARY 4: Under all signal realizations, the leader always gives a higher offer (weakly) 
to the second follower, i.e., s*2 ≥ s*1 .
PROOF:
See Appendix.
Let us consider a numerical example. Let δ = 0.5, ρ = 1.5, and π = 100. Assume that the noise 
term ε is uniformly distributed over {−20, −10, 0, 10, 20} and the second follower’s prior belief of 
the first offer is normally distributed with mean s*1 and variance σ1 = 20.7 With these parameters, 
the equilibrium first offer is s*1 = 25. Given the offer, the first follower will accept (i.e., a*1 = 1).
The possible signal values are {5, 15, 25, 35, 45}. The equilibrium second offers conditional on the 
signal are given in Table 1. 
The second follower always accepts the offer at equilibrium. In this example, note the follow-
ing about the relationship between the second offer and the signal:
(i)  The second offer, s*2 , is nondecreasing in the signal. At the highest possible signal, the 
offer is about 20 percent above the first offer, s*1 ;(ii)  The second offer, s*2 , is always greater than the first offer, s*1 = 25, a constraint imposed 
by distributional fairness concerns. This result suggests that the leader is more generous 
to the second follower.
D. A Variant with simultaneous Offers
In this subsection, we consider a simultaneous analog of the model. As before, the leader has 
two separate pies to divide, each with a separate follower. However, the difference is that the 
leader now makes offers to both followers simultaneously. The game begins with the leader mak-
ing offers si to follower i = 1, 2. Each follower i may accept the offer (ai = 1) or reject it (ai = 0). 
If ai = 1, the leader receives π − si and follower i receives si ; otherwise, both receive zero from 
the corresponding pie. Note that each follower’s acceptance decision influences only the division 
of one of the two pies.8
Consistent with the earlier setup, each follower’s offer is privately observed, but there is a sig-
nal inference process before the followers make their decision. Let Δ = s2 − s1 denote the true 
difference between the two offers (which is known to the leader but not to either follower). Both 
followers observe a public signal of this difference, z = Δ + ε, where ε is a zero-mean random 
noise term with distribution f (·). Like before, the followers have noisy rational expectations. 
7 We chose these parameters and assumptions because they are close to our structural estimates and experimental 
setup described below.
8 This is different from Fehr and Schmidt (1999), who consider multiple receivers responding to offers on the same 
pie.
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Each follower’s prior belief g (·) over the difference Δ is normally distributed with mean Δ and 
standard deviation σ. After each follower i observes the signal z and her own offer si, each fol-
lower forms a posterior belief over the other offer. Specifically, letting m(z) ≡ E [ Δ | z], follower 
1’s posterior expectation is E[ s2 | z, s1 ] = s1 + m(z), while follower 2’s posterior expectation is 
E[s1 | z, s2] = s2 − m(z). Observe that m(z) is the followers’ common posterior belief of the differ-
ence between the two offers. When m(z) > 0, both followers believe that the leader has made a 
higher offer to follower 2, and vice versa.
Based on the signal z, each follower chooses whether to accept or reject. Let us first focus on 
follower 1. Follower 1’s utility is
 s1 − δ max { 0, π − 2s1 } − ρ max { 0, m(z)}
from accepting the offer, and zero from rejecting it. Given the offer
 s1 =   δ π + ρ  
__ m 1 ________
1 + 2δ  
for some  
__ m 1 > 0, follower 1 will accept it as long as m(z) ≤  __ m 1. In other words, the threshold  __ m 1
represents the largest unfavorable disparity in payoffs that follower 1 is willing to tolerate. 
Therefore, the offer s1 will be accepted with probability P { m(z) ≤  __ m 1 }. Now, let us turn to fol-
lower 2, whose utility is
 s2 − δ max { 0, π − 2s2 } − ρ max { 0, − m(z)}
from accepting, and zero from rejecting. As above, if given the offer
 s2 =   δ π + ρ  
__ m 2 ________
1 + 2δ  
for some  
__ m 2 > 0, follower 2 will accept it whenever m(z) ≥ − __ m 2, which occurs with probability 
P { m(z) ≥ −  __ m 2 }.
Anticipating the followers’ response, the leader chooses the optimal offers s*1, s*2 to maximize 
expected payoff given by
 (π − s1) P { m(z) ≤  __ m 1 }  +  (π − s2 ) P { m(z) ≥ −  __ m 2 } .
Table 1—Equilibrium Second Offers in a Numerical Example
Signal (z) Equilibrium second offer (s2*)
5 25
15 26.30
25 27.69
35 28.96
45 30.25
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In equilibrium, there are three possible scenarios, depending on the signal realization z. When 
m(z) < −  __ m 2, only follower 1 accepts. When −  __ m 2 ≤ m(z) ≤   __ m 1, both offers are accepted. When 
m(z) >  __ m 1, only follower 2 accepts.
We experimentally test the sequential game rather than the simultaneous game for three rea-
sons. First, the sequential game is probably more common in practice (e.g., pattern bargaining). 
Second, the sequential setup is richer for model estimation. Since the leader observes the signal 
realization before making the second offer, she can choose the second offer based on the signal. 
Third, the sequential game allows us to separate whether the leader herself genuinely cares about 
treating the followers the same way or if she strategically responds to followers having peer-
induced fairness. If the former is true, s*2 = s*1. If the latter is true, s*2 > s*1.
II. Experimental Procedure
Seventy-five undergraduate students at a western university participated in the experiment.9 
There were four experimental sessions. Each session had between 15 and 21 subjects and always 
consisted of 24 decision rounds. Each subject played the game 24 times. The matching protocol 
was such that subjects were randomly matched with others in each round and they never knew 
the identities of other players. Each session lasted for one and a half hours. Subjects were paid 
a show-up fee of $5 for arriving on time and earned an average payment of about $19. Before 
the experiment began, subjects were read the instructions aloud and were given a chance to ask 
questions in private. A copy of the instructions is given in Appendix B. The entire experiment 
was computerized to facilitate information passing and random matching. 
We simplified the decision task as much as possible. For example, the instructions provided a 
table that shows the possible first offers corresponding to a given signal value. The anonymous 
subject matching procedure was intended to avoid communication between subjects. Since a 
random matching protocol is used in each round, we controlled for collusion, reciprocity, and 
reputation-building behaviors. Therefore, each round could be framed as a one-shot game with 
new partners. In each round, subjects were randomly grouped in triplets. In each triplet, the 
three subjects were randomly assigned the roles of RED (leader), BLUE1 (the first follower), 
or BLUE2 (the second follower).10 The three players played two independent ultimatum games, 
each with a pie size of 100 points, in sequence. 
RED and BLUE1 played Game I first. RED moved first and chose the first offer s1 (an integer 
between 0 and 100) at which she wished to divide the pie between herself and the first follower. 
The computer routed the information on s1 to BLUE1. BLUE1 then decided whether to accept the 
offer. If BLUE1 chose to accept, RED and BLUE1 received the allocated amount accordingly. If 
BLUE1 rejected, both players earned zero points. 
To construct the signal z, we drew a number from a discrete uniform distribution over the set 
{−20, −10, 0, 10, 20} and added it to the first offer. Consequently, given a signal z, the subjects 
could infer what the first follower is likely to receive. To measure  ˆ    s1(z), we asked BLUE2 to make 
9 It is common to use undergraduates to test theories of industrial organization (see Charles A. Holt 1995). The 
results could, in principle, be replicated with managers. Several previous studies comparing professionals and students 
find little difference between the two groups (see Charles R. Plott 1987; Sheryl B. Ball and Paula-Ann Cech 1996). 
Alternatively, one could use student subjects with different levels of experience with the task to assess whether experts 
behave differently from novices (e.g., Yun J. Jung, John H. Kagel, and Dan Levin 1994).
10 We chose a role-switching design for two reasons. First, this design makes the average payoff of each subject simi-
lar (since every subject has an equal chance to be the leader). Second, we believe that such a design increases subjects’ 
understanding of the game and hence reduces noise in the data.
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a guess of what the first offer was and rewarded the player a modest sum of ten points for making 
a correct guess.11 
Finally, RED and BLUE2 played Game II. RED moved first and made an offer s2 to BLUE2. 
BLUE2 could either accept or reject. If BLUE2 chose to accept, both players received payoffs as 
allocated. Otherwise, both received nothing. The outcomes, including whether BLUE2 guessed 
correctly, were revealed only at the end of each decision round comprising of both Games I and 
II. Each BLUE player received only the outcomes of her own game. 
Each player’s total point earnings for a decision round were recorded. Note that the leader 
received point earnings from both Games I and II. At the end of the session, point earnings for 
all rounds were summed up and redeemed for cash payment at the rate of $0.01 per point (i.e., 
each ultimatum game involved dividing a pie of $1).
III. Estimation
A. Basic Results
Table 2 shows the basic results. Note that few offers are above 50 percent of the pie. Across the 
two games, less than 5 percent of the offers are within this range. The modal offer is between 30 
percent and 35 percent for both games. Few offers are below 15 percent of the pie. No more than 
3.5 percent of the offers fall into this range across the games. Hence, the subgame perfect equi-
librium prediction of a very low offer is strongly rejected. There is a clear pattern of a higher rate 
of rejection as the offer decreases. For example, there is no single offer in the range of 45 percent 
to 50 percent that was rejected, while the rate of rejection ranges from 25.9 percent to 31.7 per-
cent when the offers are within the range of 25 percent to 30 percent. The overall results suggest 
that subjects are not purely self-interested. In general, our results are comparable to those of prior 
11 One of the reviewers remarked that the belief elicitation procedure itself could have changed the second follower’s 
acceptance decision. To test for this conjecture, subjects in one session were not asked to guess the first offer before 
their acceptance decision. We analyzed subjects’ decisions in this session separately and found the structural estimates 
from this session to be similar to those of the other three sessions. Consequently, we pool all the data in our structural 
estimation below.
Table 2—The Distribution of Offers and the Rates of Rejection
Game I Game II
Offer range Offers (percent) Rejected (percent) Offers (percent) Rejected (percent)
> 50  29  (4.8) 0  (0)  28  (4.7) 0  (0)
50  35  (5.9) 0  (0)  35  (5.9)  2  (5.7)
45–49.5  14  (2.3) 0  (0)  24  (4.0) 0  (0)
40–44.5 109 (18.2)  1  (0.9) 116 (19.4)  2  (1.7)
35–39.5  93 (15.6)  6  (6.5)  75 (12.5)  5  (6.7)
30–34.5 140 (23.4) 15 (10.7) 149 (24.9) 13  (8.7)
25–29.5  58  (9.7) 15 (25.9)  63 (10.5) 20 (31.7)
20–24.5  77 (12.9) 15 (19.5)  74 (12.4) 11 (14.9)
15–19.5  22  (3.7)  8 (36.4)  14  (2.3)  6 (42.9)
10–14.5  14  (2.3)  7 (50.0)  17  (2.8) 11 (64.7)
< 10   7  (1.2)  6 (85.7)   3  (0.5)  2 (66.7)
All 598 (100.0) 73 (12.2) 598 (100.0) 72 (12.0)
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studies, except that the offers are slightly lower and followers tend to reject less frequently. The 
four experimental sessions produced 600 observations. There were two observations for which 
the leader made an offer of 100 (the entire pie) in either Game I or Game II. These data points 
were removed as outliers, so our dataset has a sample size of N = 598.
We tested the data for time trends in the leader’s offers as well as the followers’ acceptance 
decisions. For the offers si, we specified the model si (t ) = κ0 + κ1 t. Here, si (t ) denotes the lead-
er’s i-th offer (i = 1 or 2) in the t-th decision round, averaged over all subjects in the same ses-
sion. In this model, κ1 captures any possible time trend. Similarly, for the acceptance decisions 
ai, we fitted the logistic regression P(ai(t) = 1) = ( e κ0+κ1t )/(1 +  e κ0+κ1t ). We found no significant 
time trends (i.e., κ1 is not statistically different from zero) for either acceptance decisions or the 
second offer. For the first offer, there was no time trend beyond round 2. All our results (e.g., 
parameter estimates) remain unchanged whether we include the first two rounds of data or not. 
In the following analysis, we assume no time trend.
B. does Peer-induced fairness Exist?
The central hypothesis of this paper is that the second follower has peer-induced fairness con-
cerns. The second follower’s utility function (equation (2)) implies that, all things being equal, 
the second follower receives a lower utility if she believes she is behind the first follower. If the 
second follower makes decision errors (i.e., quantal-respond instead of best-respond), the second 
follower is less likely to accept an offer if the difference between  ˆ    s1(z) and the offer s2 is high.12 
Table 3 below shows how the rate of rejection varies depending on whether the second follower 
believes she is ahead (s2 −  ˆ    s1(z) > 0), on par (s2 −  ˆ    s1(z) = 0), or behind (s2 −  ˆ    s1(z) < 0). 
The results are clear: the second follower rejects a lot more frequently when she is behind than 
otherwise (23.5 percent versus 4 percent). We test this formally by running a random effects 
logistic regression with BLUE2’s decision a2 against the second offer s2 and how much it differs 
from BLUE2’s guess (which is an estimate for  ˆ    s1 (z)). Let superscripts i and t denote subject and 
decision round, and let x+ = max { x, 0 }. Formally, we have
(15)  P( a 2 it = 1) =  exp { γ 0 
  i + γ1  s 2  it + γ2 ( ˆ    s1  it (z it  ) −  s 2 it )+}    _____________________________  
1 + exp { γ 0   i + γ1  s 2  it + γ2 ( ˆ    s1  it (z it  ) −  s 2 it  )+ } ,
where  γ 0   i are subject-specific random effects. If BLUE2 has peer-induced preferences, we would 
expect γ2 to be negative. The estimation result shows that  ˆ      γ2 = −0.024 ( p-value = 0.05). This 
result suggests that the second follower may indeed be reluctant to accept an offer that is inferior 
to that of a peer.13 This finding also casts some doubt on the self-interested assumption and theo-
ries that ignore peer-induced fairness concerns.
12 It is interesting to check whether the second follower’s inference  ˆ    s1(z) is accurate. We regress the second follower’s 
guess against the actual amount received by the first follower. Formally, we have  ˆ    s1(z) = ω0 + ω1 a1s1. The best fitted 
regression line yields  ˆ      ω0 = 25.4 percent (p-value < 1 × 10−16  ) and  ˆ      ω1 = 0.26 ( p-value = 4.1 × 10−10  ). This suggests 
that the second follower’s inference is aligned with the first offer but exhibits some biases. They tend to overestimate 
the first offer when it is less than 34 percent and underestimate it when it is above 34 percent.
13 Upon a reviewer’s suggestion, we also test for the existence of peer-induced fairness by manipulating the notion of 
a peer systematically. We ran a control session by making the first follower no longer a peer for the second follower. We 
used the same sequential game setup, except that we manipulated the degree of similarity of the followers’ situations by 
using a random device to determine the leader’s offer to the first follower so that the second follower perceived the first 
offer to be incomparable to the second offer. Our results reveal that the second follower’s decision becomes independent 
of first follower’s payoff and there is indeed no peer-induced fairness effect in the control session:  ˆ      γ2 = 0.024 ( p-value 
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It is possible that the first follower may also exhibit peer-induced fairness. The first follower 
may look ahead and anticipate what the second follower will receive in the future. If this is true, 
the first follower’s expectation may influence her decision to accept. We check this conjecture by 
running a random effects logistic regression with BLUE1’s decision a1 against the first offer s1 
and how much it differs from the (anticipated) second offer s2. Here, we assume that BLUE1 is 
able to predict the second offer perfectly. Formally, we have
(16)  P( a 1 it = 1) =   exp{ γ 0 
  i + γ1  s 1  it + γ2 ( s 2  it −  s 1  it )+ }   ________________________    
1 + exp{ γ 0  i + γ1  s 1   it  + γ2 ( s 2  it  −  s 1  it )+ } ,
where  γ 0   i captures random effects. Like before, we would expect γ2 to be negative and statisti-
cally different from zero. Our result indicates otherwise (the estimated  ˆ      γ2 = −0.01 < 0, p-value = 0.58).
C. did the Leader Respond to Peer-induced fairness?
Proposition 1 suggests that the leader’s offer in Game II is nondecreasing in  ˆ    s1(z). Indeed, it is 
piecewise linear in  ˆ    s1(z) if the latter is sufficiently high. Figure 1 shows the observed frequencies 
of the difference between the second offer and the guess, i.e., (s2 −  ˆ    s1(z)). Note that this differ-
ence centers around zero and drops quickly as the difference gets larger, suggesting that the offer 
may be influenced by the guess. 
A simple test for this prediction is to regress s2 against  ˆ  
  s1(z). Formally, we have
(17)   s 2  it =  α  0  i  + α1  ˆ    s1   it (z it  ),
where  α  0  i  are random effects. If the prediction is right, we expect α1 to be positive. The regres-
sion results suggest that α1 is indeed positive and statistically significant ( ˆ      α1 =0.09 and p-value = 3.5 × 10−3 ). This result implies that the leader is strategic and aligns her second offer with the 
second follower’s inference  ˆ    s1(z). As the second follower’s inference increases, the leader who 
accounts for peer-induced fairness also strategically raises the second offer.
Furthermore, Corollary 4 suggests that by responding to peer-induced fairness concerns, the 
leader tends to be more generous to the second follower (i.e., s2* > s1*). We test this prediction 
using two methods. First, we treat each game outcome involving each triplet in a round as an 
independent observation. We perform a Wilcoxon signed-rank test with the null hypothesis that 
the medians of the distributions of the first and second offers are equal against the alternative 
hypothesis that the second is greater than the first. We use a one-sided test. There were n = 295 
= 0.41). This finding shows that when the second follower does not perceive the first follower as a peer, the former does 
not exhibit peer-induced fairness concerns.
Table 3—Different Rates of Rejection when Follower 2 is Ahead or Behind
Being ahead (s2 −  ˆ    s1(z) > 0) On par (s2 −  ˆ    s1(z) = 0) Being behind (s2 −  ˆ    s1(z) < 0)
N Number of rejections N Number of rejections N Number of rejections
165 6 (3.6 percent) 110 5 (4.5 percent) 179 42 (23.5 percent)
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observations for which the two offers were different. Under the null, the test statistic W (sum of 
signed ranks) is normal with mean zero and standard deviation  √ _______________  (n(n + 1)(2n + 1))/6  =  2,933. 
We obtain W = 5,295 ( p-value = 0.03), and thus we can reject the null hypothesis. In the second 
method, we treat each subject’s average offer across rounds as an independent observation. So, 
for each of the 75 subjects, we compute the average first offer and average second offer (across 
rounds). We then performed the one-tailed Wilcoxon test as before. The corresponding p-value 
is 0.04, and thus we can again reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we conclude that the second 
offer is indeed more generous (marginally) than the first offer.
D. Parameter Estimation
To formally estimate the relative importance of peer-induced and distributional fairness con-
cerns, we structurally estimate the model parameters. The proposed model has two parameters, 
δ and ρ. The model involves four decisions, s1, s2, a1, and a2. We assume normal error terms ξ1, ξ2 
for the leader’s decisions,
(18)  s1 = s1* + ξ1,
(19)  s2 = s2* + ξ2,
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Figure 1. Observed Frequencies of the Difference between the Second Offer 
and the Guess 
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so s1 and s2 have normal density φ1(·), φ2(·) with means of s1* and s2* and variances of  σ 1  2 and  σ 2  2, 
respectively. The followers’ utilities have an extreme value error term so that their acceptance 
probability has a logistic form with parameters λ1 and λ2 given below:
(20) P1(δ, λ1) =    e Uf1 (δ)/λ1  _________  
1 +  e Uf1 (δ)/λ1 ,
(21) P2(δ, ρ, λ2) =    e Uf2 (δ, ρ)/λ2 __________  
1 +  e Uf2 (δ, ρ)/λ2 .
In summary, the likelihood function for a set of decisions s1, s2, a1, and a2 is
(22)  φ1(s1) φ2(s2) (P1 ) a1 (1 − P1 ) (1−a1) (P2 ) a2 (1 − P2 ) (1−a2) ,
which we maximize over the parameters δ, ρ, σ1, σ2, λ1, λ2.
Table 4 shows the estimation results. We estimate the full model and two nested models. The 
first column presents the nested model without any fairness concerns (i.e., δ = ρ = 0 or agents are 
purely self-interested). The second column gives the results when players have only distributional 
fairness concerns (i.e., ρ = 0). The third column presents the full model. Both nested models 
are strongly rejected when compared to the full model, indicating that subjects care about both 
distributional and peer-induced fairness. The self-interested hypothesis is clearly rejected (χ2 
= 1,963.2, p-value < 1.0 × 10−16 ). The nested model where the second follower has only distri-
butional fairness is also strongly rejected (χ2 = 108.0, p-value < 1.0 × 10−16 ), suggesting that 
the second follower clearly has peer-induced fairness concerns. In the full model, the estimated 
peer-induced fairness parameter is  ˆ      ρ = 1.746, which is larger than the estimated distributional 
fairness parameter of  ˆ  
  δ = 0.501. Given these parameter estimates and the logit specification in 
(21), the second follower’s probability of rejection increases by 0.5 percent as her material pay-
off lags behind the leader’s by one additional point (out of π = 100). Analogously, the second 
follower’s probability of rejection increases by 1.8 percent when her expected payoff difference 
behind the first follower increases by one point. These results suggest that peer-induced fairness 
(between followers) weighs more heavily than distributional fairness (between the leader and a 
follower) in the second follower’s behavior. 
Table 4—Estimation Results
Parameter No fairness Distributional fairness only Full model
δ — 0.597 0.501
ρ — — 1.746
λ1 13.730 17.094 12.653λ2 14.139 16.688 24.702σ1 35.131 13.590 14.924σ2 35.017 12.895 11.082
log likelihood −6,327.1 −5,408.5 −5,354.5
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IV. Incorporating Heterogeneity
Our basic model adopts a representative-agent approach and assumes that all players have 
identical fairness concerns. In this section, we incorporate heterogeneity by analyzing a two-
segment model in which one segment is purely self-interested and the other segment has both 
distributional and peer-induced fairness concerns. This extension is useful because a fraction of 
players is likely to be purely self-interested and we can then determine how self-interested play-
ers’ behaviors are influenced by the existence of fairness-minded players. 
In the two-segment model, let θ denote the fraction of the self-interested segment (i.e., the seg-
ment that has ρ = δ = 0). The remaining segment has distributional and peer-induced fairness 
concerns, represented by the parameters δ and ρ, as before. We shall derive the subgame perfect 
equilibrium using backward induction. The next proposition characterizes the leader’s optimal 
offer s2* in the second game. The key observation is that the leader may either make the same 
offer characterized in Proposition 1 (which induces both types to accept) or simply offer zero (in 
which case only the purely self-interested followers will accept). The former is preferred when 
the fraction of fairness-minded players is sufficiently large (i.e., θ sufficiently small).
PROPOSITION 5: suppose the follower’s inference is  ˆ    s1(z). denote
(23)  ˜    s2 = min emax e π δ ______ 1 + 2 δ ,   π δ + ρ  ˆ    p (z)  ˆ    s1(z)  ____________1 + 2 δ + ρ  ˆ    p (z) ,   ρ   ˆ    p (z)  ˆ    s1(z)  _________1 + ρ  ˆ    p (z) f ,  π (1 + δ) _______1 + 2δ   f .
The leader’s optimal offer to the second follower is
  ˜   s2, if π −  ˜    s2 − δ max { 0, 2 ˜    s2 − π } ≥ θ π,(24) s2* = e 0, if π −  ˜    s2 − δ max { 0, 2 ˜    s2 − π } < θ π.
PROOF:
See Appendix. 
Next, consider the first game when there are both self-interested and fair-minded types. 
Similarly as above, the leader faces a choice between making the minimum acceptable offer to 
induce the fair-minded types to accept, and offering zero (in which case only the self-interested 
types will accept). As the next proposition shows, the former is preferred when the fraction of self-
interested types θ is sufficiently small. The cutoff value for θ can be calculated numerically.
PROPOSITION 6: There exists some cutoff   ˜  
  θ ∈ [0, 1] such that the leader’s optimal offer to the 
first follower is
  π δ ______ 
1 + 2 δ , if θ ≤  ˜ 
  θ,(25) s1* = e 
 0, if θ >  ˜   θ.
PROOF:
See Appendix. 
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We structurally estimate this two-segment model using the experimental data.14 This task helps 
to determine the fraction of the purely self-interested segment θ. Table 5 shows the estimation 
results. The first column, for convenience, replicates the estimation results of the one- segment 
model, while the second column adds one additional parameter that represents the size of the 
purely self-interested segment (θ ). 
These results strongly suggest that there is substantial heterogeneity in subjects’ preferences for 
fairness. About 50 percent of the subjects are estimated to be purely self-interested. Consequently, 
the representative-agent assumption is strongly rejected (χ2 = 729.0, p-value < 1.0 × 10−16). 
Furthermore, observe that the model estimates for the fair-minded segment are   ˆ 
   δ  = 0.771 and  ˆ     ρ 
=1.619. Note that the degree of aversion to being behind a peer (ρ) is two times stronger than the 
degree of aversion to being distributionally behind (δ). Given these parameter estimates, within 
the fair-minded segment, the second follower’s probability of rejection increases by 1.9 percent 
(4.0 percent) as her material payoff lags behind the leader’s (respectively, the first follower’s) by 
one additional point. As before, these results suggest that peer-induced fairness concerns influ-
ence the second follower’s actions more heavily than distributional fairness concerns.
V. Economic Applications of Peer-Induced Fairness
Many economic models can be substantially enriched by incorporating peer-induced fair-
ness. In this section, we sketch three simple applications in which peer-induced fairness plays 
an important role. Specifically, we show how peer-induced fairness alone (without distributional 
14 Formally, we express the likelihood function for the data as follows. Let ( s 1  it ,  s 2  it ,  a 1  it ,  a 2  it ) be the decisions made 
by subject i in decision round t. Let  T L 
  i,  T f1 
   i
 ,  T f2 
  i
 denote the sets of decision rounds during which subject i is the leader, 
follower 1, and follower 2, respectively. Given the model parameters θ, δ, ρ, σ1, σ2, λ1, λ2, the likelihood function for 
our data is
(26)   ∏ 
i
 
 
 cθ a  ∏ 
t∈ T L   i
 
   φ 1 0( s 1  it  )  φ 2 0( s 2  it )  ∏ 
t∈ T f1   i 
 
 
  ( P 1  0 )  a 1   it  (1 −  P 1  0 ) (1− a 1 it )  ∏ 
t∈ T f2   i 
 
 
  ( P 2  0)  a 2   it  (1 −  P 2  0 ) (1− a 2   it  ) b
 + (1 − θ) a  ∏ 
t∈ T L   i
 
  φ1( s 1   it ) φ2( s 2   it )   ∏ 
t∈ T f1   i 
 
 
  (P1 )  a 1   it  (1 − P1 ) (1− a 1   it )   ∏ 
t∈ T f2   i 
 
 
  (P2 )  a 2   it   (1−P2 ) (1− a 2   it ) b d ,
where φ1, φ2, P1, and P2 are given as in (18) to (21), and  φ 1 0,  φ 2 0,  P 1  0, and  P 2  0 are defined similarly, but with δ = ρ = 0. 
The expression in each pair of parentheses above represents the likelihood of observing subject i’s decisions, given that 
subject i is of a particular type (i.e., either self-interested or fair-minded) across all relevant decision rounds. In our 
structural estimation, we maximize the likelihood function (26) over the parameters θ, δ, ρ, σ1, σ2, λ1, λ2.
Table 5—Estimation Results for Model Extensions
Parameter Full model (one segment) Full model (two segments)
δ 0.501 0.771
ρ 1.746 1.619
λ1 12.653 9.941λ2 24.702 10.033σ1 14.924 10.410σ2 11.082 10.821θ — 0.503
LL −5,354.5 −4,990.0
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fairness) can limit the degree of price discrimination, account for low variability in CEO com-
pensation, and lead to the occurrence of labor strikes.
A. Price discrimination
Many firms charge the same price in different markets, even though the opportunity for price 
discrimination exists. Peer-induced fairness provides a plausible rational explanation for this 
phenomenon. Consider a monopoly selling in two separate markets i = L, h. Suppose that the 
demand function for each market is linear, with di(  pi) = Ai − pi for i = L, h. Equivalently, we 
can think of each market as a mass of Ai consumers, whose valuations are uniformly distributed 
between 0 and Ai. Let AL < Ah. In other words, we can think of Market L as the low-value mar-
ket and Market h as the high-value market. The marginal production cost for both markets is 
denoted c. By the standard textbook analysis, we can calculate the monopoly’s profit-maximizing 
price in each market to be pi* = (Ai + c)/2. Under this result, the monopolist charges a higher 
price in the high-value market than in the low-value market.
Now, suppose that consumers have peer-induced fairness concerns. Similar to our model setup, 
assume that the monopolist enters the two markets sequentially. In this case, consumers in the 
late market will be averse to paying a higher price compared to consumers in the early market. 
Which market should the monopolist target first?
Consider first the case where the monopolist enters the high-value market before moving to the 
low-value market. Note that the profit-maximizing prices remain unchanged at  pi* = (Ai + c)/2. 
This is because the price p*h for the high-value market sets a high reference point for social com-
parison. Consequently, consumers in the low-value market who face a lower price p*L  will not be 
affected by peer-induced fairness concerns.
However, the analysis changes dramatically when the monopolist first enters the low-value 
market. This initial price for the low-value market sets a reference point for consumers in the 
high-value market.15 When a consumer from the high-value market with valuation v pays price 
ph for the product and the earlier price set for the low-value market is pL, the consumer receives 
utility v − ph − ρ ( ph − pL ). Therefore, only consumers with valuations at least ph + ρ( ph − pL ) 
are willing to buy. In other words, peer-induced fairness makes it more costly for the monopolist 
to raise prices in the high-value market beyond that in the low-value market. It can then be shown 
that with peer-induced fairness concerns, the optimal prices satisfy (AL + c)/2 < p*L  ≤ p*h < (Ah + c)/2. Specifically, when ρ is small enough, we have
(27)  p*L  =  
  AL + c +  ρ __ 2 a Ah _____ 1 + ρ − cb   ___________________
2 −   ρ2 _______ 
2(1 + ρ)  
  >   AL + c _____
2
  ,
(28)  p*h =  
 
Ah + ρ p*L  ________
1 + ρ   + c
  ___________
2
   <   Ah + c ______
2
  .
15 There are three possible market entry scenarios. The firm can either enter both markets simultaneously, enter the 
low-value market first, or enter the high-value market first. The analysis applies to the first two scenarios. It also applies 
to the third scenario if we allow consumers who make early purchases to look ahead and make social comparison with 
consumers who make late purchases.
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However, when ρ is sufficiently large, the monopolist prefers to eliminate price discrimination 
completely; this is done either by charging the same price p*L   = p*h = ( __ A + c)/2 in both markets, 
where  
__ A = (AL + Ah)/2 if AL is large enough, or by simply forsaking the low-value market if 
AL is too small. This analysis clearly indicates that the price differential over the two markets 
p*h − p*L   is smaller when there is peer-induced fairness. This discussion also suggests that the 
monopolist should first sell in the high-value market to maximize profit.
B. Executive Compensation
Why are CEO salaries so high? With the attractive executive remuneration packages in prac-
tice, the marginal utility gained from the last dollar in a CEO’s pay is likely to be very small. 
That is, when the CEO’s utility function u (x) exhibits diminishing marginal utility, the marginal 
value of the x-th dollar u′ (x) is very small when x is very large. Since the CEO is not much worse 
off without that last dollar, why, then, are CEO salaries so high?
Peer-induced fairness concerns provide a possible explanation. Suppose that CEOs engage in 
social comparison with their peers, i.e., other CEOs. In this case, their utility function can be 
modeled as v (x) = u (x) − ρ max { 0,  ˆ    x − x }, where u(x) is the utility for money as above, and  ˆ    x
is the average compensation received by the focal set of CEOs. Since individuals are likely 
to engage in upward social comparison by selecting individuals who are better as comparison 
benchmarks, we expect  ˆ    x > x. Then, the marginal value of the x-th dollar is v′ (x) ≈ ρ, which may 
be much higher than zero (when x is large, u′ (x) is negligible). This discussion suggests that CEO 
remuneration packages are high not because of their material value, but because of the need to 
avoid discomforting social comparison (see also Charness and Peter Kuhn  (2004) for theory and 
evidence on wage compression and secrecy).
Peer-induced fairness also suggests that the reference or focal CEO set ( ˆ    x) can significantly 
influence this social comparison process. For instance, O’Reilly, Main and Crystal (1988) show 
that there is a strong association between CEO compensation and the average compensation level 
of outside directors who serve on the compensation committee. This finding can be explained if 
CEOs treat members of the compensation committee as their peers.
C. Union Negotiation
In many industries, a large part of the workforce is represented by a nationally organized union 
which engages in pattern bargaining with multiple firms (Marshall and Merlo 2004). Pattern bar-
gaining consists of three features. First, the union chooses to negotiate with firms sequentially. 
Second, the union chooses the order with which it negotiates with firms. Third, the agreement with 
the first firm becomes the reference point that sets the pattern for all subsequent negotiations. 
Suppose union U and firm f are negotiating over a pie, the size of which is normalized to one 
unit. Both U and f will receive the outside option of zero if they do not come to an agreement. 
If they do, let x and 1 − x be the shares of U and f, respectively. Then, by standard analysis, it 
follows that for any x ∈ (0, 1), both parties will strictly prefer an agreement. In this case, we have 
(0, 1) as the feasible set. 
Let the union’s agreement with the first firm be x′ ∈ (0, 1). Now, consider a subsequent 
negotiation between the union and another firm. If the union (or its members) exhibit peer-
induced fairness concerns, then in the current negotiation, U ’s utility from receiving x will be 
x − ρ max { 0, x′ − x}. Observe that the feasible set of this game is now smaller, consisting only 
of allocations x ∈ (( ρx′/(1+ρ)), 1) ⊂ (0, 1). That is, pattern bargaining reduces the feasible set 
of negotiation outcomes in the interests of the union. In addition, the union has an incentive to 
choose an order in which x′ is maximized in the first firm.
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Firms may also exhibit peer-induced fairness and bring to their respective negotiation their 
own comparison benchmarks. Let a specific firm’s reference point be x″. In this case, f’s utility 
from receiving 1 − x will be 1 − x − ρ max { 0, (x − x″)} . We would expect x′ > x″ since 
each party’s “comparable” outcome is likely to be biased in their own favor. For instance, Marc 
J. Knez and Camerer (1995) show experimentally that people apply different benchmarks for 
comparison when they have different outside options. Linda Babcock, Xianghong Wang, and 
Loewenstein (1996) provide empirical evidence for such a self-serving bias in teacher contract 
negotiations (see also Anand M. Goel and Anjan V. Thakor (2005) for how optimal contract 
design could change as a result of peer-induced fairness effect and Werner Guth et al. (2001) 
for a nice discussion on a similar issue). In this case, the feasible set of the game becomes 
x ∈ (( ρx′)/(1 + ρ), (1 + ρx″)/(1 + ρ)). In fact, when x′ − x″ > 1/ρ, the feasible set is empty. This 
might occur when the two reference points diverge too widely (i.e., the gap x′ − x″ is too large), or 
when the degree of peer-induced fairness ρ is large. This could explain why many labor contract 
negotiations end up in a strike. In most cases, there had been ample time and opportunities for 
interaction between negotiating parties. Peer-induced fairness suggests that an agreement is not 
feasible in the first place.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we study peer-induced fairness in games. Peer-induced fairness concerns are 
prevalent because people have a natural tendency to look to their peers when evaluating their 
payoffs. This predisposition toward social comparison closely relates to the notions of conform-
ism (Akerlof 1980; B. Douglas Bernheim 1984) and social influence (Yan Chen et al. 2007). We 
examine two distinct kinds of fairness concerns: (i) distributional fairness concerns (relative to 
other players in a game) and (ii) peer-induced fairness concerns (relative to one’s peers). Our 
work builds on that of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), which posits that economic agents experience a 
disutility when they receive a different material payoff compared to another reference agent or 
group. 
We investigate peer-induced fairness in a sequence of two independent ultimatum games 
played by a leader and two followers. The leader plays an ultimatum game with the first follower, 
and then the same leader plays the same ultimatum game with the second follower. The games 
are independent in that each follower receives material payoff only in their respective game. 
Within each ultimatum game, the leader and the corresponding follower exhibit distributional 
fairness concerns in that both are averse to receiving less than the other. Between the two games, 
there is peer-induced fairness concerns in that the second follower is averse to receiving less than 
the first follower. In our model, the second follower does not perfectly observe what the first fol-
lower receives, but there is an information collection stage between the two games. That is, after 
the first ultimatum game, the second follower observes an imperfect signal of what the first fol-
lower is likely to receive before playing the second ultimatum game. We analyze the equilibrium 
of this game under imperfect information. Without peer-induced fairness, the second follower’s 
acceptance decision and the leader’s offer in the second game should not be influenced by the 
signal. In contrast, with peer-induced fairness, our model predicts that the second follower’s 
behavior will be influenced by her inference of the first follower’s payoff, and that the leader will 
align the second offer with the second follower’s inference.
We test our model predictions experimentally. Subjects are randomly assigned the roles of leader 
and followers and are motivated by financial incentives. We find strong support for our model pre-
dictions. Specifically, the second follower’s rate of rejection increases with the difference between 
the second offer and her inference of the first follower’s payoff. Also, the leader aligns the second 
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offer close to the inference of the first follower’s payoff in order to avoid rejection by the second 
follower. In combination, these results strongly suggest the existence of peer-induced fairness. We 
also structurally estimate our model using the experimental data. Our estimation results show that 
peer-induced fairness is distinct from distributional fairness, and the former is crucial in explaining 
subjects’ behavior. The parameter estimates suggest that the second follower has a preference for 
peer-induced fairness that is two times stronger than her  preference for distributional fairness (i.e., 
the former weighs more heavily in the second follower’s decision).
We extend the basic model by allowing a fraction of the subjects to be purely self-interested. 
Our structural estimation results indicate that about half of the subjects are purely self-interested 
while the other half exhibit fairness concerns. This result suggests that it is important to incorpo-
rate heterogeneity in the strategic analysis of games. Finally, we show how peer-induced fairness 
plays a key role in several economic applications. For example, peer-induced fairness can restrict 
a monopoly’s ability to price discriminate, account for the low variability in CEO compensation, 
and lead to the occurrence of labor strikes.
Appendix A: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
The leader faces two alternatives. First, he may offer zero, which induces the follower to reject, 
and this leaves the leader with zero utility. Second, he may choose the optimal offer, among all 
the offers that are acceptable to the second follower. In other words, the leader solves the follow-
ing problem:
 ma x s2 UL,ii (s2, 1 | z)
 s.t. Uf2 (s2, 1 | z) ≥ 0.
Note that this problem is equivalent to
 mi n s2 s2
 s.t. Uf2 (s2, 1 | z) ≥ 0,
since the leader’s utility UL,ii  (s2, 1 | z) always increases as s2 decreases. Introducing the variables 
w1 = max {π − 2s2, 0} and w2 = max{ ˆ   s1 − s2, 0}, we obtain the following problem. Denote the 
solution by  s 2 
0:
 mi n s2,w1,w2 s2
 s.t. s2 − δ w1 − ρ  ˆ    pw2 ≥ 0
  w1 ≥ π − 2s2
  w2 ≥  ˆ   s1 − s2
  w1, w2 ≥ 0.
Notice that the feasible region above can be expressed in terms of only s2 to yield
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  mi n s2 s2
 s.t. s2 − δ(π − 2s2) − ρ ˆ    p( ˆ    s1 − s2) ≥ 0 ⇔  s2 ≥   πδ + ρ ˆ  
  pˆ   s1 __________  
1 + 2δ + ρ ˆ    p 
 s2 − δ(π − 2s2) ≥ 0 ⇔  s2 ≥   πδ ______ 1 + 2δ 
 s2 − ρ ˆ    p( ˆ    s1 − s2) ≥ 0  ⇔  s2 ≥   ρ ˆ  
   pˆ   s1 ______ 
1 + ρ ˆ    p 
 s2 ≥ 0.
Therefore, among all the offers that are acceptable to the second follower, the offer that maxi-
mizes the leader’s utility UL,ii (s2, a2 | z) is
  s 2 
0  =  max e πδ ______ 
1 + 2δ ,  
πδ + ρ ˆ    pˆ   s1 __________  
1 + 2δ + ρ ˆ    p ,  
ρ ˆ    pˆ   s1 _____
1+ρ ˆ     p  , 0f .
Next, notice that the offer  s 2 
1 that leaves the leader with zero utility is
  s 2 
1  =  π −   πδ ______ 
1 + 2δ  =   
π(1 + δ) _______
1 + 2δ  .
Finally, we see that the leader’s equilibrium offer in the second game must be min{ s 2 0,  s 2 1}, as 
given in the proposition.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
Consider two possible offers s1 and s′1 =s1 + k with k > 0. Under the same noise term ε, the 
signal realizations are z = s1 + ε and z′ = s′1 + ε in the two cases. Note that they differ by k 
exactly. Given the same noise term ε, the posterior distribution h′ of the first offer under true 
offer s′1 is thus a translation (to the right) of the posterior distribution h of the first offer under 
true offer s1. Let  ˆ  
  p,  ˆ    s1 denote the inferences corresponding to true offer s1, and let  ˆ  
  p′,  ˆ    s1′ denote 
the inferences corresponding to true offer s′1, under some fixed noise term ε. Note that  ˆ    p′ =  ˆ     p + 
kh(A) + o(k) and  ˆ    s1′ =  ˆ    s1 + k + kAh(A) + o(k). Recall A = (δπ)/(1 + 2δ) is the first follower’s 
acceptance threshold.
To prove our result, we shall show that the equilibrium second offer satisfies s*2( ˆ    p′,  ˆ    s1′ ) ≥ 
s*2 ( ˆ    p,  ˆ    s1). From Proposition 1, considering each individual term separately, it suffices to show (πδ + ρ ˆ     p′ ˆ    s1′ )/(1 + 2δ + ρ ˆ    p′ ) ≥ (πδ + ρ ˆ     pˆ   s1 )/(1 + 2δ + ρ ˆ    p) and (ρ ˆ    p′ ˆ   s1′ )/(1 + ρ ˆ    p′ ) ≥(ρ ˆ    pˆ   s1 )/(1 + ρ ˆ    p).
For the first inequality above, we need to show
 [πδ + ρ(  ˆ    p + kh(A))( ˆ    s1 + k + kAh(a))][1 + 2δ + ρ ˆ     p] ≥ [πδ + ρ ˆ    pˆ   s1][1 + 2δ + ρ(  ˆ    p + kh(A))].
This inequality holds because we have ρkh(A) ˆ    s1(1 + 2δ + ρ ˆ     p) ≥ (πδ +ρ ˆ    pˆ   s1)ρkh(A), since  ˆ    s1 ≥ (δπ)/(1 + 2δ) as the first follower’s acceptance threshold is A = (δπ)/(1 + 2δ). For the second 
inequality above, we need to show
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 ρ[  ˆ    p + kh(A)][ ˆ    s1 + k + kAh(A)][1 + ρ ˆ     p] ≥ ρ ˆ    pˆ   s1[1 + ρ( ˆ     p + kh(A))].
This inequality holds because the right-hand side exceeds ρ ˆ     pˆ   s1(1 + ρ ˆ    p) by ρ2 ˆ    pˆ   s1 kh(A) but the 
left-hand side exceeds by more.
Therefore, we have shown that for each noise term ε, the equilibrium second offer is larger 
when the first offer is s1′ compared to s1. The lemma thus follows.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
By Lemma 2, we know that EU *L,ii (s1) is decreasing in s1. Also, note that U *L,ii (z) ≤ 
UL,i ((πδ)/(1 + 2δ), 1). This holds because for any z, U *L,ii (z) = UL,ii(s*2(z), a*2(z) | z) ≤
UL,ii  ((πδ)/(1 + 2δ), 1 |z) ≤ UL,i((πδ)/(1 + 2δ), 1).
Now, we evaluate the two alternatives facing the leader: offer zero (and the first follower 
rejects) or offer the optimal acceptable offer (and the follower accepts). Recall that the leader 
wishes to maximize UL,i (s1, a1) + EU *L,ii (s1). When the leader offers zero to the first fol-
lower, the first term is zero and the second term is at most UL,i((πδ)/(1 + 2δ), 1). Alternatively, 
the leader may make an offer that is acceptable to the first follower. Recall that only offers 
s1 ≥ A = (πδ)/(1 + 2δ) are acceptable. Since both UL,i(s1, a1) and EU *L,ii (s1) are decreasing 
in s1, the leader’s optimal offer that is acceptable to the follower is s1 = (πδ)/(1 + 2δ). In this 
case, the first term is UL,i ((πδ)/(1 + 2δ), 1) and the second term is nonnegative. The proposi-
tion thus follows.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4:
This follows from comparing the results in Propositions 1 and 3.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
It is clear that  ˜    s2 is the minimum offer that is acceptable to the type with fairness concerns. 
The leader may either: (i) offer  ˜    s2 and receive UL,ii( ˜    s2, 1), or (ii) offer 0 and receive π with prob-
ability θ and 0 with probability 1 − θ (i.e., the expected utility is θπ). The leader thus chooses the 
better alternative, as characterized in the proposition.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
Recall that the leader wishes to maximize UL,i(s1, a1) + UL,ii(s2, a2), where a1 and a2 now 
refers to the acceptance decisions of the fair-minded types. Note from Proposition 5 that along 
the equilibrium path, we have U *L,ii (s2, a2 ) = max {UL,ii( ˜    s2, 1), UL,ii (0,0)} = max {UL,ii( ˜    s2, 1), θπ}. 
Thus the reasoning in the proof of Lemma 2 continues to apply to the first term, and thus Lemma 
2 holds. Therefore, the only candidates for the first offer s1 are 0 and (π δ)/(1 + 2 δ). We will 
analyze the increase in the leader’s utility when he offers s1 = 0, compared to when he offers s1 = (π δ)/(1 + 2 δ); in this proof, we term this his incremental utility.
In Game I, the leader’s utility from offering (π δ)/(1 + 2 δ) does not depend on θ; however, the 
leader’s utility from offering 0, which is θπ, has derivative π with respect to θ.
Next, consider the leader’s incremental utility from Game II along the equilibrium path. When 
s1 = 0, the leader’s utility is max {UL,ii( ˜    s2, 1 ∣ s1 = 0), θπ}. When s1 = (π δ)/(1 + 2 δ), the leader’s 
utility is max {UL,ii( ˜    s2, 1 | s1 = (π δ)/(1 + 2 δ)), θπ}. In both cases, the first term does not depend 
on θ and the second term has derivative π with respect to θ. Therefore, the derivative of the incre-
mental utility (i.e. the difference) with respect to θ must be at least −π.
Combining the two games, the derivative of the incremental utility with respect to θ must be 
nonnegative. In other words, as θ increases, offering s1 = 0 always becomes more attractive. The 
proposition thus follows.
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Appendix B: Instructions
This is an experiment in economic decision making. The instructions are simple and if you 
follow them carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable amount of money 
which will be paid to you in cash before you leave today. Different subjects may earn different 
amounts of cash. What you earn today depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions 
of others, and partly on chance. 
The experiment consists of 24 decision-making rounds. There are 21 subjects in this room. In 
each round, we will randomly group you into seven triplets. In each round and in each triplet, 
one subject will be a RED player and two subjects will be BLUE players (BLUE1 and BLUE2). 
You have an equal chance of playing the role of RED, BLUE1, or BLUE2 in each round. The 
decision-making task of each player will be explained below. 
It is important that you do not look at the decisions of others, and that you do not talk, laugh ,or 
exclaim aloud during the experiment. You will be warned if you violate this rule the first time. If 
you violate this rule a second time, you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. That is, 
your total earnings will be zero. 
Experimental procedure 
In each round, the decision making task occurs in three stages, namely, I, II, and III. Each 
RED player and the two matched BLUE players (BLUE1 and BLUE2) undertake the task as fol-
lows. Again the assignment of your role is determined randomly so that each person in the triplet 
has an equal chance of playing RED, BLUE1, or BLUE2. 
In Stage I, RED and BLUE1 will have a pot of 100 points to divide between them (BLUE2 will 
sit still in this stage). RED will make an offer of OFFER1 (ranging from 0 to 100 points) to give 
to BLUE1. After receiving OFFER1, BLUE1 must decide whether or not to accept it. If BLUE1 
accepts the offer, RED will receive 100–OFFER1 points and BLUE1 will receive OFFER1 
points. However, if BLUE1 rejects the offer, both RED and BLUE1 will receive nothing in that 
decision-making round. Note that the outcome of Stage I (i.e., whether BLUE1 accepts the offer) 
will be revealed to RED only at the end of Stage III. 
In Stage II, we randomly draw a number from a set of 5 numbers: {−20, −10, 0, 10, 20}. That 
is, each number has an equal chance of being drawn. We call the drawn number X. We generate 
a signal called SIGNAL1 by adding X to OFFER1. We will use the number SIGNAL1 in Stage 
III. Note that each triplet involves a different independent draw in each decision round. However, 
each draw is always from the same set consisting of the same five numbers. 
Let’s consider two examples to see how this signal generation process works. If SIGNAL1 
= 30, then there are five possible scenarios: 
Offer 1 X Signal 1
50 −20 30
40 −10 30
30 0 30
20 10 30
10 20 30
Note that if SIGNAL1 = 30, OFFER1 can range from 10 to 50 depending on the value of the 
random number X.
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Similarly, if SIGNAL1 = 70, we have the following five possible scenarios: 
Offer 1 X Signal 1
90 −20 70
80 −10 70
70 0 70
60 10 70
50 20 70
That is, OFFER1 can range from 50 to 90. Note that the two examples above are chosen purely 
for illustration purposes. In no way, the shown values are indicative of the optimal choices. 
BLUE2 will guess what OFFER1 is. If BLUE2 guesses correctly, he or she will receive a total 
of ten points. If BLUE2 guess wrongly, he or she will receive nothing. Note that BLUE2’s guess, 
and whether it is correct, will be revealed to RED and BLUE2 only at the end of Stage III. 
In Stage III, RED and BLUE2 will have a pot of 100 points to divide between them (i.e., 
BLUE1 will sit still). Before RED makes her offer, both RED and BLUE2 will be informed of 
the value of SIGNAL1. Note that SIGNAL1 is generated by adding the random draw X described 
in Stage II to the OFFER1 made by RED to BLUE1 in Stage I. Then, RED will make OFFER2 
(ranging from 0 to 100 points) to give it to BLUE2. After receiving OFFER2, BLUE2 must 
decide whether to accept the offer. If BLUE2 accepts the offer, RED will receive 100–OFFER2 
points and BLUE2 will receive OFFER2 points. However, if BLUE2 rejects the offer, both RED 
and BLUE2 will receive nothing in that decision round. 
At the end of Stage III, the RED and both BLUE subjects will be informed of their respective 
decision outcomes and point earnings. This decision task is repeated for 24 times. In each round, 
seven triplets will be formed. Each player in the triplet will have an equal chance playing RED, 
BLUE1, or BLUE2. 
Payoffs 
Your dollar earnings for the experiments are determined as follows. First, we will sum up your 
total point earnings from all 24 rounds. Then we will multiply your point earnings by 0.01. This 
is the amount you will be paid when you leave the experiment. Note that the more points you 
earn, the more money you will receive.
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